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Lebanon: Middle East Escalation, LTC Situation Report (Telecoms) #02 - Reporting period: 18–31 March 2026
Country: Lebanon Sources: Emergency Telecommunications Cluster, World Food Programme Please refer to the attached file. This situation report provides updates on Middle East Escalation, with a focus on the security situation in Lebanon. It outlines the Telecom Area activities of the Logistics & Telecommunications Cluster (LTC) in supporting coordination, connectivity, and communications for the humanitarian response. The Cluster was formally activated on 16 March 2026 and is led by the UN World Food Programme (WFP). Summary Points Lebanon’s telecommunications system remains highly fragile, running largely on emergency power and vulnerable to cascading outages. Core Internet Service Provider (ISP) infrastructure and mobile networks are still functioning, but southern areas continue to face disruptions due to ongoing fighting, access constraints, and localized damage Since activating on 16 March, the LTC has led the telecoms response, advancing ICT working group business continuity planning, preparing a telecoms assessment in southern Lebanon, and engaging partners and authorities on VHF network reviews, connectivity mapping, and Starlink licensing Under the OCHA‐led Flash Appeal, the LTC is requesting USD 397,497 for the first three months to ensure humanitarians and affected communities have reliable connectivity. No funding has been received to date.
2026-04-02 06:33:06

Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026 - Summary
Country: Sudan Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Please refer to the attached Infographic. OVERVIEW The 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan is based on a comprehensive, countrywide inter-sectoral analysis of needs in Sudan. In 2026, 33.7 million people require humanitarian assistance — the highest number globally and an increase of 3.3 million from 2025. Those most at risk include women and girls, children, older people, persons with disabilities, internally displaced people, refugees and ethnic minorities, who face heightened protection risks, including violence, exposure to hostilities, explosive hazards, repeated displacement, exploitation and exclusion. As communities endure an unprecedented humanitarian and protection crisis, they are also confronting a sharp reduction in life-saving assistance due to major funding cuts. These shortfalls are affecting all sectors, including support for people facing the most severe conditions. In response, and in line with the Humanitarian Reset, partners undertook a strict prioritization exercise. The plan should be understood as a basic survival package of urgent, life-saving assistance for those in most dire need. More than 170 humanitarian organizations are delivering principled, multi-sectoral assistance targeting those most in need. Partners aim to assist 20.4 million people , including 14 million facing extreme conditions. To deliver this response, $2.9 billion is required. Preparations included consultations with about 3,500 people and 145 community-based organizations across all 18 states, ensuring the response remains accountable to affected communities.
2026-04-02 06:27:44

Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026 - Summary (March 2026) [EN]
Country: Sudan Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Please refer to the attached file. OVERVIEW The 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan is based on a comprehensive, countrywide inter-sectoral analysis of needs in Sudan. In 2026, 33.7 million people require humanitarian assistance — the highest number globally and an increase of 3.3 million from 2025. Those most at risk include women and girls, children, older people, persons with disabilities, internally displaced people, refugees and ethnic minorities, who face heightened protection risks, including violence, exposure to hostilities, explosive hazards, repeated displacement, exploitation and exclusion. As communities endure an unprecedented humanitarian and protection crisis, they are also confronting a sharp reduction in life-saving assistance due to major funding cuts. These shortfalls are affecting all sectors, including support for people facing the most severe conditions. In response, and in line with the Humanitarian Reset, partners undertook a strict prioritization exercise. The plan should be understood as a basic survival package of urgent, life-saving assistance for those in most dire need. More than 170 humanitarian organizations are delivering principled, multi-sectoral assistance targeting those most in need. Partners aim to assist 20.4 million people , including 14 million facing extreme conditions. To deliver this response, $2.9 billion is required. Preparations included consultations with about 3,500 people and 145 community-based organizations across all 18 states, ensuring the response remains accountable to affected communities.
2026-04-02 06:27:44

Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026 - Summary (March 2026)
Country: Sudan Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Please refer to the attached Infographic. OVERVIEW The 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan is based on a comprehensive, countrywide inter-sectoral analysis of needs in Sudan. In 2026, 33.7 million people require humanitarian assistance — the highest number globally and an increase of 3.3 million from 2025. Those most at risk include women and girls, children, older people, persons with disabilities, internally displaced people, refugees and ethnic minorities, who face heightened protection risks, including violence, exposure to hostilities, explosive hazards, repeated displacement, exploitation and exclusion. As communities endure an unprecedented humanitarian and protection crisis, they are also confronting a sharp reduction in life-saving assistance due to major funding cuts. These shortfalls are affecting all sectors, including support for people facing the most severe conditions. In response, and in line with the Humanitarian Reset, partners undertook a strict prioritization exercise. The plan should be understood as a basic survival package of urgent, life-saving assistance for those in most dire need. More than 170 humanitarian organizations are delivering principled, multi-sectoral assistance targeting those most in need. Partners aim to assist 20.4 million people , including 14 million facing extreme conditions. To deliver this response, $2.9 billion is required. Preparations included consultations with about 3,500 people and 145 community-based organizations across all 18 states, ensuring the response remains accountable to affected communities.
2026-04-02 06:27:44

Iran: Tras un mes de guerra en Oriente Medio, la crisis humanitaria es cada vez más grave para la población infantil
Countries: Iran (Islamic Republic of), Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, occupied Palestinian territory Source: UN Children's Fund Más allá del impresionante número de víctimas, los retrasos y las interrupciones en las operaciones de suministro ponen en peligro a la infancia en todo el mundo NUEVA YORK, 30 de marzo de 2026 – Tras más de un mes de escalada militar en Oriente Medio, el conflicto sigue causando daños devastadores a los niños y niñas de toda la región. Según los informes, más de 340 niños y niñas han perdido la vida y miles han resultado heridos. Esto incluye 216 muertos y 1.767 heridos en Irán; 124 muertos y 413 heridos en el Líbano; 4 muertos y 862 heridos en Israel; 1 niño muerto en Kuwait; 4 niños heridos en Baréin; y 1 niño herido en Jordania. El incidente con mayor número de víctimas infantiles se produjo el primer día de la guerra, en un ataque con misiles contra la escuela Shajareh Tayyebeh en Irán que causó la muerte de 168 niños y niñas. Los ataques implacables de las partes en conflicto en varios países están destruyendo y dañando las instalaciones y la infraestructura de las que depende la población infantil, incluidos hospitales, escuelas y sistemas de agua y saneamiento. La violencia que persiste en el Estado de Palestina (incluidos Gaza y Cisjordania) durante el mismo periodo ha causado la muerte de 16 niños y niñas palestinos y ha dejado más de 50 heridos. “Los niños y niñas de la región están expuestos a una violencia atroz, mientras que los propios sistemas y servicios destinados a garantizar su seguridad están siendo objeto de ataques”, afirmó la Directora Ejecutiva de UNICEF, Catherine Russell. “Es necesario que todas las partes en conflicto tomen medidas urgentes para proteger la vida de los civiles y defender los derechos de la población infantil”. En toda la región, más de 1,2 millones de niños y niñas han sido desplazados, ya que los bombardeos y las órdenes de evacuación han dejado vacías comunidades enteras. Esta conmoción suele ir acompañada de la exposición a acontecimientos traumáticos y la pérdida de todo aquello que antes hacía que los niños y niñas se sintieran seguros. Se sabe que la exposición prolongada a la violencia y la inestabilidad tiene efectos duraderos en el desarrollo cerebral, la regulación emocional y la salud mental a largo plazo. Las hostilidades en curso están afectando cada vez más a la población infantil de Oriente Medio y de otras regiones. UNICEF estima que las interrupciones en el aprovisionamiento, la producción y el transporte causadas por los conflictos podrían provocar retrasos de hasta seis meses en la llegada de suministros esenciales a países de todo el mundo. El aumento de los precios mundiales del petróleo, que se prevé que suban hasta un 20%, podría provocar un incremento adicional de los costes de fabricación de artículos vitales, como vacunas y productos nutricionales, así como de los costes de transporte. Además, los problemas logísticos, como la congestión portuaria y los desvíos en las rutas de envío, están agravando estas dificultades, ya que los desvíos marítimos añaden hasta cuatro semanas de retraso a los tiempos normales de tránsito. En respuesta a las interrupciones del suministro mundial, UNICEF mantiene un flujo constante de suministros esenciales para los niños y niñas de todo el mundo mediante la activación de rutas alternativas por tierra, mar y aire, la diversificación de las fuentes de suministros estratégicos que salvan vidas y la anticipación de las adquisiciones para adaptarse a plazos de entrega más largos. Además, UNICEF está negociando activamente con los transportistas para limitar los recargos excesivos y dar prioridad a los bienes humanitarios, con el fin de garantizar que las regiones afectadas sigan recibiendo el apoyo esencial del que dependen los niños y niñas. En Irán, a petición del Ministerio de Salud, UNICEF está desplegando suministros sanitarios posicionados de antemano, incluidas unidades sanitarias móviles, tiendas de campaña de atención primaria y botiquines sanitarios de emergencia, con el fin de restablecer el acceso a los servicios esenciales para aproximadamente 226.000 personas en las zonas afectadas. Este apoyo abarca el abastecimiento de vacunas y de suministros adicionales de atención primaria y apoyo psicosocial y de salud mental para niños, niñas y adolescentes en las comunidades donde viven. De manera similar, en medio de crecientes problemas, UNICEF ha ampliado su respuesta de emergencia en el Líbano para hacer llegar a los niños, niñas y familias asistencia humanitaria urgente. Esto incluye llegar a las personas desplazadas más vulnerables que se encuentran en refugios colectivos, comunidades de acogida y zonas de difícil acceso. Junto con sus aliados, UNICEF ha ampliado los servicios de salud para apoyar a las familias desplazadas con un conjunto de respuestas integradas –que incluye servicios de vacunación, neonatales y de cuidados intensivos pediátricos– en más de 290 refugios, y para más de 480.000 personas en las comunidades de acogida. Además, UNICEF ha reparado 20 sistemas de agua y saneamiento en todo el país con el fin de reestablecer servicios fiables de agua y alcantarillado para más de 1,2 millones de personas. UNICEF reitera los llamamientos del Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas para que cesen de inmediato las hostilidades y se produzca una desescalada real. Todas las partes deben actuar con la máxima moderación. En virtud del derecho internacional humanitario, los civiles —especialmente los niños y niñas— y los bienes de carácter civil deben estar siempre protegidos. Contactos de prensa Ammar Ammar UNICEF Ammán Teléfono: +962 791 837 388 Correo electrónico: aammar@unicef.org Ricardo Pires Jefe de comunicación UNICEF Ginebra Teléfono: +41 79 481 5021 Correo electrónico: rpires@unicef.org
2026-03-31 20:33:07

Lebanon: Le HCR appelle à un soutien d'urgence au Liban où se dessine une catastrophe humanitaire
Country: Lebanon Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees *Ceci est un résumé des déclarations Karolina Lindholm Billing, représentante du HCR au Liban – à qui toute citation peut être attribuée – lors de la conférence de presse du 27 mars 2026 au Palais des Nations à Genève. 30 mars 2026 * Depuis près d’un mois que le conflit s’intensifie, le Liban est confronté à une crise humanitaire qui ne cesse de s’aggraver. Depuis le 2 mars, à la suite d’intenses frappes israéliennes et d’ordres d’évacuation généralisés, plus d’un million de personnes – soit un habitant sur cinq – ont été contraintes de fuir leur foyer. Les déplacements s’étendent désormais du sud et de la Bekaa jusqu’à Beyrouth et au nord, et le nombre de personnes déplacées ne cesse d’augmenter. Même dans les zones où ils ont trouvé refuge, les gens ne se sentent plus en sécurité. La semaine dernière, des frappes israéliennes ont touché le centre de Beyrouth, notamment les quartiers densément peuplés de Zokak Blat et de Bashoura, où de nombreuses personnes avaient cherché refuge. L'une des frappes a touché un quartier situé à un pâté de maisons d'une école accueillant des familles déplacées, que j'avais visitée avec le gouverneur de Beyrouth quelques jours auparavant. Les familles vivent dans une peur constante, et les séquelles psychologiques, en particulier chez les enfants, perdureront bien au-delà du conflit actuel. L'accès à la sécurité devient également de plus en plus difficile. La destruction de ponts stratégiques dans le sud a coupé des quartiers entiers du reste du pays, isolant plus de 150 000 personnes et limitant considérablement l'accès humanitaire. Bon nombre des familles que le HCR, l'Agence des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés, rencontre chaque jour, sont déplacées pour la deuxième ou la troisième fois. Plusieurs sont revenues dans les mêmes écoles où elles avaient trouvé refuge en 2024. Aujourd'hui, plus de 136 000 personnes déplacées sont hébergées dans 660 centres d'accueil collectifs, pour la plupart des écoles, qui sont bien au-delà de leur capacité d'accueil. La surpopulation, le partage des salles de classe et l’accès limité aux installations sanitaires et autres services de base augmentent considérablement les risques en matière de protection, notamment l’exposition à l’exploitation et à la violence sexiste. Les personnes âgées et celles en situation de handicap sont particulièrement touchées, ayant du mal à dormir sur le sol des salles de classe ou à utiliser des installations destinées aux enfants. Le stress et les traumatismes s’intensifient dans ces conditions de promiscuité et d’insalubrité. Au-delà des besoins immédiats en matière d’hébergement, il existe un besoin clair et urgent de renforcer la protection et le soutien communautaire. Lors d’une récente visite dans l’un des plus grands centres d’accueil de Saïda, qui héberge plus de 1 000 personnes, j’ai pu constater à quel point la collaboration peut contribuer à redonner dignité et autonomie aux personnes déplacées. Les autorités centrales et locales, le HCR, les ONG et les bénévoles travaillaient aux côtés des familles déplacées pour organiser des activités ludiques et éducatives pour les 400 enfants hébergés sur place. Les hommes et les femmes déplacés participaient également à des activités culinaires, tandis que le HCR et ses ONG partenaires offraient un accompagnement psychologique et un soutien spécifique en matière de protection. Le risque d’une catastrophe humanitaire est réel. Mais en soutenant la réponse d’urgence menée par le gouvernement et décrite dans l’appel d’urgence pour le Liban, d’autres risques – notamment la violence, l’exploitation et la montée des tensions – peuvent être atténués. Le HCR continue d’assurer la coordination de la protection et de l’hébergement en collaboration avec le ministère des Affaires sociales et ses ONG partenaires, et a distribué plus de 198 000 articles de première nécessité, tout en s’efforçant d’améliorer l’intimité et la dignité au sein des centres d’accueil. À ce jour, le HCR et ses partenaires ont apporté un soutien à plus de 27 000 personnes grâce à des services de protection, notamment un soutien psychosocial, des activités récréatives, des services de conseil et une aide ciblée pour les plus vulnérables. Avec un financement adéquat pour notre appel initial de plus de 60 millions de dollars, nous pouvons intensifier ces programmes dans le cadre de la réponse interinstitutionnelle. Ce soutien va au-delà de l’urgence immédiate en renforçant les systèmes nationaux de protection et de protection sociale que le gouvernement s’efforce de réformer. En répondant aux besoins urgents d’aujourd’hui, nous investissons simultanément dans leur viabilité et leur résilience à long terme. Cependant, les besoins augmentent plus vite que les ressources. Sans une offre accrue de logements, la surpopulation s’aggravera. Sans un renforcement de la protection, les risques pour les enfants, les femmes et les groupes vulnérables s’accroîtront. Si l’aide ne parvient pas rapidement aux populations, la détresse se transformera en tensions. Le Liban était déjà confronté à de multiples crises, et ce déplacement massif exerce une pression immense sur les familles et les services. Les civils doivent être protégés à tout moment. Les gens me répètent sans cesse la même chose : ils veulent simplement rentrer chez eux. Notre devoir est de les aider jusqu’à ce qu’ils puissent le faire en toute sécurité. Pour plus d'informations à ce sujet, veuillez svp contacter :
2026-03-30 10:33:33

COI Query - Syria: Developments concerning military service, the situation of Kurds, and the security situation in areas (formerly) controlled by Kurdish-led forces
Country: Syrian Arab Republic Source: European Union Agency for Asylum Please refer to the attached file. COI QUERY RESPONSE – Syria Developments concerning military service, the situation of Kurds, and the security situation in areas (formerly) controlled by Kurdish-led forces 1. Military service and recruitment by Kurdish-led forces The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), formed in 2015, are a paramilitary group, predominantly made up of Kurds. 1 The group controlled most of northeastern Syria during the Syrian civil war, 2 although by February 2026, the SDF’s control was limited to areas around the cities of Qamishli, Hasaka and the town of Kobane on Syria’s border with Turkey. 3 Sources indicated that the SDF retained between 70 0004 and 100 000 soldiers, 5 although a considerable portion of their military force had defected, specifically Arab fighters, following the Syrian government’s military advances on 17–18 January 2026. 6 As of June 2024, the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), the Kurdish-led government entity in which the SDF serves as the main military force, 7 announced that individuals born between 1998 and 30 June 2006 are required to perform ‘self-defense duty’ in the region, adding that those turning 18 must report to selfdefense centres to obtain a duty card.8 Further information on SDF compulsory military service could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this query. On recruitment methods, sources indicated that the SDF were carrying out forced conscriptions, as of October 2025.9 An October 2025 article by The New Arab, citing a local news source affirmed that the SDF ‘have launched a widespread conscription campaign targeting young men, in what is believed to be a preparation for confrontation with Syrian government forces’.10 The same source added that the SDF were targeting young people born between 1999 and 2007.11 An October 2025 article by the independent local news source Enab Baladi reported that the SDF had ‘intensified compulsory recruitment campaigns under what they call the “duty of self-defense,”’ in Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Hasaka provinces in northeastern Syria. 12 The source further noted that at the end of September, the SDF Military Police detained more than 500 people in Raqqa alone. 13 A January 2026 Al Jazeera article, quoting a local resident from Deir ez-Zor following the government forces’ takeover of the area, reported that many feared repression by the SDF, as well as the prospect of forced conscription.14
2026-03-30 10:33:26

Ethiopia: Migration Along the Eastern Southern Africa Route (January–September 2025) - Report 2 | January–September 2025 Publication: 30 March 2026
Countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Somalia, South Africa, United Republic of Tanzania, Zimbabwe Source: International Organization for Migration Please refer to the attached file. About the Report The Eastern Southern Africa Route is a risky migration route travelled by migrants across the East, Horn and Southern Africa, many of whom travel irregularly, often relying on smugglers to facilitate movement. This report provides updates on complex migratory dynamics through Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa based on diverse data sources and consultations with key informants. Moreover, it provides information on the main challenges for migrants along the journey, the response by IOM, and information on forced returns from South Africa to countries of origin. Key Findings Outgoing migration trends • Between January and September 2025, exits from Ethiopia fell by 33% compared to 2024 but rebounded by 61% in (July–September 2025) after monitoring resumed. Flows by Somali nationals fluctuated, with only 11 tracked, though additional nationals were identified in transit countries. • Malawi recorded 1,800 transits in August–September, dropping by 58% in September due to elections. • Zimbabwe tracked 115,300 movements toward South Africa, though flows fell by 27% between July–September 2025 after data collection suspension in September. • Mozambique registered 62,600 flows heading to South Africa in this reporting period, mainly temporary visits and repeat travel joureys, while the United Republic of Tanzania reported 2,500 stranded migrants, mostly Burundians. • Overall, South Africa remained the primary destination, with economic drivers dominant, but mobility remains short-term, seasonal, and repeat in nature. Return migration trends • Malawi recorded around 600 returns, largely Malawian nationals, driven by family reunification and temporary visits. • Zimbabwe tracked 176,300 return movements in 2025, though flows fell by 20% in this reporting period due to suspended data collection during September, with most originating from South Africa and dominated by short-term, local migration. • In Mozambique, authorities reported over 5,000 deportations of Mozambican nationals from South Africa. No significant returns were recorded to Kenya, Somalia, or Tanzania. Challenges along the route • Migrants along the Eastern Southern Africa Route faced persistent protection risks. In Mozambique, administrative detention continued due to the lack of reception facilities. • In South Africa, rising anti-migrant rhetoric ahead of the 2026 elections fuelled xenophobic tensions, with children and youth particularly vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation. • In Somalia, migrants were exposed to abandonment, harsh environmental conditions, and arrest for lacking documentation. • In Malawi, elections held in September temporarily reduced mobility, while drought and fuel shortages heightened food insecurity and constrained movements. Response to challenges along the route • IOM assisted 327 Ethiopian migrants to return from Malawi and the United Republic of Tanzania, mostly stranded irregular migrants. • IOM assisted 298 migrants with emergency aid at MRCs, up by 52% from the previous quarter (196). Most assistance was delivered in Moyale, and nearly all beneficiaries reported being detained during their journey. Men accounted for 98% of those assisted, while 22 were children, the majority (20) unaccompanied. • Support included transportation assistance (289), shelter and non-food items (291), psychosocial support (291), and food and water (291). Assistance levels spiked by 179% in August following mass releases of detained migrants. • In Zimbabwe, unaccompanied Mozambican children were rescued from exploitative conditions and returned to Mozambique with support from IOM and UNICEF. • In Malawi, safehouses and prisons continued to provide shelter for victims of trafficking and smuggled migrants. Deaths and disappearances during migration • Between January and September 2025, 16 migrant deaths were reported in the western Indian Ocean compared to 22 reported during the same period in 2024. Two incidents in Mayotte accounted for five fatalities, including two children, following boat collisions and capsizing.* • Most deaths along this route are linked to unsafe sea travel on unseaworthy vessels, with drowning as the primary cause. Data remain fragmented and incomplete due to limited reporting capacities and the irregular nature of movements. Foresight (3 to 6 months) • Flows from Ethiopia may rise if security stabilizes and monitoring continues. • Somali flows will likely remain underreported but may increase with expanded data collection. • Economic migration through Kenya is expected to grow, influenced by regional elections and labour demand. • The United Republic of Tanzania will remain a key transit hub with persistent irregular migration. • In Malawi, flows to South Africa may rebound after elections but could be constrained by fuel shortages and drought. • Zimbabwe is likely to continue as a major transit country, with seasonal and short-term migration prevailing. • Mozambique will remain a transit hub, though high deportations are expected to continue.
2026-03-30 10:33:20

World: EU steps up support for disaster preparedness and humanitarian aid in Asia
Countries: World, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka Source: European Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations The European Commission has released nearly €11 million to support humanitarian aid and strengthen disaster preparedness across Asia in 2026. Over €8.7 million will fund disaster preparedness initiatives throughout the region, the majority through a regional allocation of €7 million covering ASEAN countries, as well as Nepal and Sri Lanka. In addition, a dedicated envelope will fund country-specific disaster preparedness actions in Nepal (€1.7 million). This funding will support the development of early warning systems, foster actions that promote climate and environmental resilience, and contribute to developing shock-responsive social protection mechanisms to help communities most at risk. In Nepal, funding will also aim at improving health emergency preparedness, as well as anticipatory actions. A further €2 million are allocated to humanitarian assistance in the Philippines, which will support populations impacted by multiple disasters such as tropical cyclones, as well as victims of conflict. This announcement comes as Commissioner for Preparedness and Crisis Management, Hadja Lahbib , is visiting Japan this week, where she will meet with national and local authorities to exchange on preparedness, disaster risk management and humanitarian aid. During her visit, the Commissioner will visit Fukushima to mark the 15th anniversary since the earthquake and tsunami of 2011, paying tribute to those who lost their lives in this devastating tragedy. She will also travel to the Noto Peninsula, which was struck by an earthquake in 2024 that claimed more than 240 lives. Commissioner for Equality, Preparedness and Crisis Management Hadja Lahbib said: ‘Japan is a like-minded partner and a global leader in humanitarian action. It has a deep experience in preparing for disasters and responding when crisis strikes. Japan is also a strong example of societal preparedness, including in schools, where children learn from an early age how to respond in an emergency. As Europe puts its Preparedness Strategy into action, Japan's experience can help us build stronger, more resilient societies . ’ Details Publication date30 March 2026 Author Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO)
2026-03-30 10:33:17

Project Highlights - Support for a research study and water resources monitoring systems in Syria (OSRO/SYR/032/JCA)
Country: Syrian Arab Republic Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Please refer to the attached file. Objective To strengthen knowledge on national water resources; improve water and climate monitoring systems; promote sustainable management of water resources; and safeguard farmers’ livelihoods. Activities implemented • Conducted a coordination workshop, ensuring effective collaboration and information-sharing among stakeholders. • Conducted nine technical meetings to define and align priorities and activities. • Formulated an implementation plan and formed a team of experts to carry out the field survey and data analysis. • Conducted a literature review to gather and report on national water resources and related challenges. • Conducted field missions in the targeted water basins and performed needs and technical assessments on water and climate monitoring networks and WRICs. • Identified and mapped main water resources and produced a report analysing water availability at the basin and national level, the factors affecting it and the impacts of water availability changes on society. • Implemented the pilot programme, with the distribution or rehabilitation of 40 water resource monitoring devices and ten climate monitoring devices. • Rehabilitated two WRICs and updated the main database to include data on observation, water facilities and supply and demand. • Trained 80 technical staff of WRICs through five practical courses that focused on the use of specific programs and applications related to water monitoring systems, data collection and information generation. • Developed recommendations for policies, systems, water-saving technologies and capacity development for sustainable water resource management. • Conducted a final research workshop to disseminate the findings of the study.
2026-03-30 10:33:14

Iran regional escalation situation report - 30 mars 2026
Country: Iran (Islamic Republic of) Source: International Organization for Migration Please refer to the attached file. MOBILITY AND DISPLACEMENT DYNAMICS IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matix (DTM) is on the ground, actively tracking displacement and cross-border mobility to better understand how the crisis is impacting human mobility in the region. As a key operational enabler, DTM provides data to drive evidence-based responses and planning in coordination with local authorities and partners. All data provided in this snapshot, unless indicated otherwise, is provided through DTM. ISLAM IC REPUBLIC OF IRA N In the Islamic Republic of Iran, damage to 82,000 civilian infrastructure and growing risks to disruption of essential services are driving complex mobility patterns, with an estimated 180,000 people affected. As displacement spreads across more than 20 provinces with possible occurrences of secondary displacement, temporary accommodation, psychosocial support mechanisms, and public hotlines are being activated at scale by the Government, reflecting a rapidly intensifying demand for emergency and humanitarian services as vulnerabilities grow among conflict-affected households. These dynamics suggest a transition from short-term, reactive movement to more sustained displacement dynamics that could reshape regional mobility trends and heighten humanitarian needs. IRAQ – ISLAM IC REPUBLIC OF IRA N BORDER Across the Iraq–Iran border, three Border Crossing Points (BCPs) were fully open as of 26 March, enabling regular movements. Four BCPs in Sulaymaniyah governorate (the Kurdistan region of Iraq) were partially open; across these, commercial transit was permitted, while the return of Iraqi and Iranian nationals was limited to Bashmagh (carrying most of the crisis-related arrivals), Twila, and Broizkhan. Separately, an estimated 575 Third Country Nationals (TCNs) have returned to their home countries via the border crossings of Ibrahim Al-Khalil (Duhok Governorate, Iraq–Türkiye border) and Fishkabor (Duhok Governorate, Iraq–Syria border). SYRIAN ARA B REPUBLIC Between 02 and 23 March 2026, DTM Syria recorded 147,823 Syrian individuals crossing from Lebanon into the Syrian Arab Republic by land. The status of the PoEs between Syria and Lebanon remained unchanged; however, IOM noted a significant decrease in cross border movements compared to previous reporting on 10 March. LEBANON Following 16 March 2026, the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) focuses on publishing the number of IDPs reported in collective sites. As of 23 March 2026, there are 134,601 IDPs in 660 collective sites. This excludes IDPs living with host communities and other settings. Round 2 of IOM Lebanon’s DTM, from 16 March, reports a total of 1,049,328 IDPs in the country (around 20% of the population). Current estimates indicate that over 40,000 migrants have been displaced, with many facing barriers to humanitarian assistance, including language, lack of information, and concerns over their migration status. ARMENIA-ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRA N BORDER Between 28 February and 10 March 2026, a total of 4,381 Iranian nationals entered the Republic of Armenia through the Agarak BCP. Overall, movements of Iranian nationals across the southern border remained steady throughout the reporting period, with no signs of large-scale arrivals or sudden fluctuations in cross-border activity. In addition to Iranian nationals, 549 TCNs entered Armenia through the Agarak crossing. AZERBAIJAN-ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRA N BORDER Between 28 February and 22 March 2026, a total of 2,921 individuals crossed from the Islamic Republic of Iran into Azerbaijan via the Astara border crossing. This includes 1,243 individuals from three countries (People’s Republic of China, Russian Federation, and Bangladesh). Overall, flows at the border with the Islamic Republic of Iran remain stable, with no indications of large-scale crossings. REPUBLIC OF TÜRKIYE – ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRA N BORDER Türkiye’s border with the Islamic Republic of Iran remains stable, with no indications of mass crossings. Movement is restricted to authorized travellers, including Turkish nationals, Iranian nationals with valid travel documents, and TCNs. Cross-border activity remains low and has declined significantly since the onset of the crisis. Flows through the Gürbulak, Kapıköy, and Esendere border gates remain orderly and two-way with movements driven primarily by routine or precautionary travel, rather than crisis-related displacement. TURKMENISTAN – ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRA N BORDER By 17 March 2026, over 500 TCNs evacuated from the Islamic Republic of Iran into Turkmenistan via four BCPs, including nationals from Canada, China, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Korea, the U.S.A, and Uzbekistan. AFGHANISTAN – ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRA N BORDER Border operations along the Afghanistan–Islamic Republic of Iran remain fully functional. Flows from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Afghanistan declined sharply by 59 per cent between 17 and 23 March (from 40,980 to 16,788) compared to the previous week (9–16 March 2026). Afghans returning from the Islamic Republic of Iran reported worsening conditions, including job losses, restricted access to workplaces, and impacts from the ongoing conflict, destroying structures. PAKISTAN – ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRA N BORDER Between 01 and 23 March 2026, a total of 7,603 individuals crossed from the Islamic Republic of Iran into Pakistan. Overall, week-on-week flows declined by 72% over the reporting period, compared to last week. All Iranian entrants hold valid documentation, such as visas, passports, or local movement passes.
2026-03-30 10:30:18

CAR: République centrafricaine - Perspectives sur la sécurité alimentaire: Le conflit prolongé, les marchés perturbés et l’épuisement rapide de stocks aggravent l’accès alimentaire (Février - Septembre 2026)
Country: Central African Republic Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Messages clé La persistance des conflits continuera d’aggraver l'accès alimentaire dans de nombreuses régions du pays. Les préfectures du nord-est, sud-est et nord-ouest (Vakaga, Haute-Kotto, Haut-Mbomou, Ouham, Ouham-Pendé, Lim-Pendé et Nana‐Mambéré) devraient connaître des résultats de Crise (Phase 3 de l’IPC) jusqu'en septembre. L’épuisement précoce des stocks renforcera la dépendance aux achats face à des revenus limités et des marchés dysfonctionnels, tandis que les déplacements de population, la restriction de mouvement et l’accès entravé aux champs, aux marchés et aux routes commerciales dans ces zones éroderont davantage les moyens d’existence des ménages. Les populations les plus touchées par les déplacements —ménages hôtes pauvres et personnes déplacés internes (PDI) —feront face à des déficits de consommation alimentaire. À partir d’avril, la soudure dans les régions au sud et la saison des pluies accentueront l’enclavement et limiteront les flux commerciaux, ce qui provoquera une hausse des prix au‐dessus des moyennes saisonnières, entraînant des résultats de Crise (Phase 3 de l’IPC) plus généralisé dans le pays. L’arrivée des premières récoltes en juillet au sud permettra une amélioration vers des résultats de Stress (Phase 2 de l'IPC) dans la majorité de ces zones, sauf dans les zones enclavées et plus affectées par les conflits. FEWS NET estime qu’entre 750 000 et 999 999 personnes auront besoin d’une assistance alimentaire humanitaire pendant le pic des périodes de soudure, entre mai et juillet 2026. Malgré l’amélioration saisonnière attendue à partir de juillet avec l’arrivée des premières récoltes au sud, de nombreux ménages pauvres dans les zones affectées par le conflit continueront de faire face à des déficits alimentaires. Ces ménages devraient rester en Crise (Phase 3 de l’IPC) au-delà même du pic de la soudure. L’analyse présentée ici est basée sur les informations disponibles 20 février 2026.
2026-03-26 04:35:46

Central African Republic - Food Security Outlook: Prolonged conflict, disrupted markets, and rapid stock depletion worsen food access (February - September 2026)
Country: Central African Republic Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Key Messages The persistence of conflicts will continue to worsen food access in many regions of the country. The prefectures of the northeast, southeast, and northwest (Vakaga, Haute-Kotto, Haut-Mbomou, Ouham, Ouham-Pendé, Lim-Pendé, and Nana-Mambéré) are expected to experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes through September. Early depletion of stocks will reinforce dependence on purchases in the face of limited income and dysfunctional markets, while population displacements, movement restrictions, and impeded access to fields, markets, and trade routes in these areas will further erode household livelihoods. Populations most affected by displacement — poor host households and internally displaced persons (IDPs) — will face food consumption deficits. Starting in April, the lean season in the regions in the south and the rainy season will increase isolation and limit trade flows, which will cause an increase in prices above seasonal averages, resulting in more widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in the country. The arrival of the first harvests in July in the south will allow an improvement toward Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes in the majority of these areas, except in isolated areas and those more affected by conflict. FEWS NET estimates that between 750,000 and 999,999 people will need humanitarian food assistance during the peak of the lean season, between May and July 2026. Despite the expected seasonal improvement starting in July with the arrival of the first harvests in the south, many poor households in conflict-affected areas will continue to face food deficits. These households are expected to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) even beyond the peak of the lean season. The analysis in this report is based on information available as of February 20, 2026.
2026-03-26 04:33:16

Atrocity Alert No. 475: Afghanistan, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory and El Salvador
Countries: Afghanistan, El Salvador, occupied Palestinian territory, Pakistan Source: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect Atrocity Alert is a weekly publication by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect highlighting situations where populations are at risk of, or are enduring, mass atrocity crimes. CROSS-BORDER FIGHTING WITH PAKISTAN EXACERBATES HEALTH CRISIS IN AFGHANISTAN On 16 March a Pakistani airstrike hit a drug rehabilitation facility in Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital, resulting in mass civilian casualties and representing a steep escalation in the conflict between the two countries. Witnesses described widespread destruction and hundreds of families searching for missing relatives. The Taliban de facto authorities reported more than 400 civilians killed and over 200 injured, which would make this the single deadliest incident in the conflict to date. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has confirmed at least 143 fatalities, adding that the toll could rise. UN observers also documented the “complete destruction” of part of the facility that housed approximately 180 adolescents, with “no survivors reported.” Since the conflict escalated in February, cross-border attacks and airstrikes have hit military infrastructure, as well as civilian homes, refugee camps and health facilities. As of 17 March, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reported 289 Afghan civilian casualties, including 104 children and 59 women. Pakistani officials also reported civilian casualties in Bajaur district and North Waziristan earlier in March. Following the 16 March strike, a Taliban spokesperson warned of retaliation, raising concerns of further escalation and civilian harm. The intensifying conflict is placing additional strain on Afghanistan’s already fragile health care system and worsening risks for vulnerable populations. Attacks on health facilities have long-term consequences, limiting access to care and deterring civilians from seeking treatment. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), 25 health facilities have closed or suspended operations, including 10 damaged by airstrikes. WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus urged all parties to “de-escalate and prioritize peace and health.” Afghanistan’s health crisis is compounded by decades of conflict, chronic underinvestment and the Taliban’s restrictions on women and girls’ access to care. In his latest report to the UN Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, Richard Bennett, found that the Taliban have imposed gender-oppressive policies that systematically impede access to health services for women and girls. This includes restrictions on freedom of movement, right to work, access to medical education and gender segregation in health facilities. Health care must be protected from attacks and obstruction. All parties to the conflict must take all feasible precautions to protect civilians and civilian objects and uphold their obligations under International Humanitarian Law, including UN Security Council Resolution 2286 on the protection of medical and humanitarian personnel. The Taliban authorities should ensure safe, timely and non-discriminatory access to health care and refrain from measures that hinder essential services. The international community should support independent and sustained monitoring of violations, ensure UNAMA can operate without restriction and press for a prompt, impartial and public investigation into the 16 March strike to ensure accountability. ISRAELI STATE-SANCTIONED SETTLER VIOLENCE ESCALATES IN THE WEST BANK Over the weekend of 21-22 March, illegal Israeli settlers carried out a series of attacks across the Occupied West Bank in what has been described as a coordinated assault. Amid celebrations marking the end of the holy month of Ramadan, dozens of settlers stormed multiple Palestinian villages, setting fire to homes and cars and injuring at least 10 Palestinians. The rampage came shortly after the funeral of an Israeli settler who was killed in a collision with a Palestinian vehicle. In response to a surge in deadly attacks in March, over a dozen diplomatic missions in Jerusalem and Ramallah – including Spain, Norway and Ireland – issued a joint statement stressing that “this violence by settler militias, aimed at taking over land and creating a coercive environment, forcing Palestinians to leave their homes, must end.” Days earlier, on 19 March over a dozen UN experts had already warned of escalating state and settler violence, denouncing their mutually reinforcing role in advancing Israel’s “annexation and ethnic cleansing policy” in the West Bank. Recent efforts to advance annexation have coincided with increased displacement of Palestinians due to settler violence and access restrictions. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, over 1,500 Palestinians have been driven from their homes since January as a result, while displacement in 2026 has already reached 95 percent of the total recorded for 2025. A pervasive lack of accountability has enabled these abuses. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has similarly found that between October 2024 and 2025 “settler violence continued in a coordinated, strategic and largely unchallenged manner, with Israeli authorities playing the central role in directing, participating in or enabling this conduct.” According to the Israeli rights group Yesh Din, of the complaints filed between 2005-2024 on offenses committed by Israeli civilians, including settlers, only three percent of cases resulted in convictions. This impunity has been exacerbated by Israel’s longstanding practice of arming settlers, which has intensified in recent years. UN experts have warned that the provision of arms and vehicles corroborates how Israeli authorities “rely on illegal settlers to ‘do the groundwork’ of the ethnic cleansing.” Within roughly six months following 7 October 2023, Israel’s Minister of National Security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, issued 100,000 gun licenses, far exceeding the previous annual average of 8,000-10,000. On 9 March he further expanded eligibility for firearms licenses to include residents of all Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem – not only those living adjacent to the West Bank – potentially extending access to an additional 300,000 people. States must ensure that targeted sanctions against settler individuals and entities are accompanied by measures addressing the broader system enabling such violence. This includes imposing two-way arms embargoes on Israel, banning trade with illegal settlements and refraining from recognizing Israel’s unlawful occupation or providing assistance that would sustain it, in line with the 2024 July Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice. STATE POLICIES IN EL SALVADOR UNDER SCRUTINY FOR POTENTIAL CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY On 11 March a group of independent experts warned in a new report that widespread human rights violations committed under El Salvador’s ongoing state of emergency may amount to crimes against humanity. The group – the International Group of Experts for the Investigation of Human Rights Violations under the State of Exception in El Salvador (GIPES) – was established in 2024 and is composed of internationally recognized jurists. GIPES documented an organized pattern of arbitrary detention, including of children and adolescents. Since the state of emergency was introduced in March 2022, an estimated 89,000 individuals have been arbitrarily detained, frequently without substantiated evidence of gang affiliation and in violation of due process guarantees. Arrests are often based on socioeconomic profiling, disproportionately targeting young men from low-income communities. Human rights organizations have also recorded the deaths of at least 403 individuals in state custody between March 2022 and August 2025. Beyond arbitrary detention, state agents also carried out torture, enforced disappearances, sexual violence, extrajudicial killings and other inhumane acts. According to GIPES, these violations may constitute crimes against humanity due to the widespread and systematic nature, their targeting of civilians and their implementation as part of a state policy. These findings build on years of documentation by human rights organizations, including Cristosal, which warned in 2023 of possible crimes against humanity. Although President Nayib Bukele introduced the state of emergency in 2022 ostensibly to curb gang-related violence and restore public security, the Group found that enabling conditions were already in place by 2021. These included the deliberate dismantling of democratic institutions and oversight, restrictions on civic space and the weakening of judicial and legislative checks – amounting to a “deliberate strategy aimed at ensuring the unrestricted exercise of State power by the head of the Executive Branch.” Taken together, these dynamics have created a permissive environment for the commission of atrocity crimes. Despite mounting evidence, the international community has remained largely silent in the face of possible crimes against humanity, effectively granting President Bukele carte blanche to pursue repressive policies with little external scrutiny or accountability. This silence extends to regional governments confronting similar challenges of gang violence, many of which are increasingly promoting and replicating the “Bukele model,” thereby legitimizing the concentration of power and the erosion of the rule of law as tools of public security. These latest findings underscore the urgent need for the international community to engage with the government of El Salvador by leveraging diplomatic channels and issuing clear and decisive public condemnation of ongoing state-led repression. UN member states, including regional actors, should support independent investigations, potentially through a dedicated Human Rights Council mechanism, impose targeted sanctions against senior officials and strengthen support for Salvadoran civil society and victims’ groups.
2026-03-26 04:26:27

Displacement, Gendered Harm, and the Normalization of Crisis in Port-au-Prince, Haiti
Country: Haiti Source: Mercy Corps Please refer to the attached file. The displacement crisis in Haiti reached record highs in 2025, with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reporting 1.4 million people internally displaced by violence. In the same year, UNICEF warned that the number of children displaced by violence in the country had nearly doubled, reaching 680,000 at the end of 2025. Despite expanding and intensifying violence outside Port-au-Prince, the highest cumulative incidence of protection harm continues to be in Haiti’s capital, where displaced women and children are at particular risk. This report synthesizes findings from 114 structured surveys and 20 key informant interviews (KIIs) conducted across five internally displaced person (IDP) camp sites in Port-au-Prince. The data suggest that life inside IDP sites is defined less by access to temporary shelter and more by ongoing exposure to violence, high rates of gender-based violence (GBV), near-total livelihood collapse, and extreme food insecurity, all compounded by weak reporting mechanisms and inadequate protective infrastructure. Survey results indicate that 95.6% of respondents do not feel their site is secure, and only 4.4% feel a sense of security. Three in ten women (30.7%) say they have experienced physical or sexual violence inside the IDP site, and two thirds note an absence of mechanisms for reporting such violence. Nearly all respondents report suffering economic collapse after their displacement (99.1% have no income) and now face severe food deprivation (96.5% of women and 87.5% of children eat fewer than two meals a day). The humanitarian significance of these findings is twofold. First, the data indicate that IDP sites in Port-au-Prince are currently functioning as risk environments rather than protective spaces, particularly in the case of adolescent girls, women-headed households, or children experiencing chronic hunger and disrupted education. Second, the baseline data provides operationally relevant insight into how harm is produced within displacement settings (e.g. due to scarcity, coercion, lack of privacy, weak accountability), filling a persistent gap in humanitarian reporting on Haiti, which is all too often dominated by a macro-level enumeration of displacement figures and access constraints.
2026-03-26 04:15:54

Mediating Resilience: Inclusive and Climate-Informed Pathways to Peace - Evidence from Uganda and Kenya (March 2026)
Countries: Uganda, Kenya Source: Mercy Corps Please refer to the attached files. Climate change is intensifying competition over land, water, and other shared resources—fueling disputes, insecurity, and violence in climate-stressed pastoralist regions. At the same time, effective natural resource governance and dispute resolution depend on inclusive processes that reflect the distinct roles and influence of men, women, and youth in both resource use and community decision-making. Yet women and girls—often central users and stewards of natural resources and informal conflict mediators—are frequently excluded from formal governance and mediation mechanisms. This exclusion weakens the legitimacy and durability of agreements and can limit communities’ ability to adapt to climate shocks and prevent conflict. This report examines how inclusive, gender-responsive natural resource management (NRM) and conflict mediation can strengthen community resilience at the climate-conflict nexus. It draws on two complementary programs in the Karamoja sub-region spanning Northeast Uganda (Kotido and Kaabong) and Northwest Kenya (Turkana): Climate Change Leaders Advancing for Peace (CCLAP, funded by the Austrian Development Agency) worked to reduce structural barriers that prevent women, girls, and youth from participating in climate-smart NRM and conflict resolution. Advancing Inclusive Mediation (AIM, funded by Ann Pelligrino) supported training-of-trainers in inclusive and climate-informed Interest-Based Mediation and Negotiation (IBMN) for the CCLAP team. Using a mixed-methods approach (baseline/endline survey analysis, focus groups, key informant interviews, and program documentation), the study asks: how inclusive NRM and inclusive, climate-informed mediation shape participation and gender attitudes—and what those changes mean for climate adaptation, resilience to shocks, and conflict dynamics. Key findings: Inclusive NRM and conflict mediation improved gender attitudes, but primarily among women. Men reported more gender-equitable attitudes overall but showed little change over time; women’s attitudes shifted significantly in program communities, and changes were stronger with greater program participation. Strengthening women’s roles in NRM increased women’s engagement and influence in community decision-making. Multiple measures, including self-reported participation, broader community perceptions, and qualitative testimonies, indicate meaningful increases in women’s participation and voice in NRM and conflict resolution processes. Inclusive NRM and mediation approaches strengthened resilience to climate- and conflict-related shocks. While resilience declined across communities during the study period, program participants fared significantly better; higher participation was associated with stronger resilience outcomes, suggesting the program buffered households and communities against shocks. Inclusive mediation strengthened conflict resolution capacities, though short-term effects on violent incidents were less clear. The program increased knowledge and engagement in conflict resolution and strengthened local mechanisms, but external violence data showed limited detectable change over the evaluation period—highlighting that governance and dispute resolution improvements may precede measurable reductions in violent events. Recommendations for policy and practice: Engage men intentionally and systematically in gender-inclusive NRM and mediation efforts. Programs should treat men’s engagement as a core component, not an afterthought, to reduce gatekeeping and backlash risks and build buy-in for women’s meaningful participation. Adopt an integrated, long-term model to build resilience. The strongest results came from linking technical climate adaptation capacity (skills/tools) with strengthened participation and influence in governance, rather than treating climate, governance, and gender as separate tracks. Focus on meaningful influence, not just participation. Increasing attendance is not enough; programs should build pathways for women, youth, and marginalized groups to exercise decision-making power and track whose input actually shapes outcomes. This evidence underscores that inclusive, climate-informed approaches to natural resource governance and mediation can strengthen community resilience in climate-conflict settings, especially when implemented with sustained engagement and designed to shift not only participation, but influence.
2026-03-26 04:12:17

Moving Beyond the Security Council’s Impasse to Support Afghanistan
Country: Afghanistan Source: International Peace Institute by Aref Dostyar , CJ Pine , and George A. Lopez On March 16th, 2026, the UN Security Council took the rare step of extending the mandate of the UN mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) for just three months rather than the standard year. This puts the council on a 90-day countdown to review and redefine its strategy in Afghanistan. While the United States, China, and Russia’s policies toward Afghanistan diverge in many regards, they unanimously agreed to the adoption of Resolution 2816 regarding the Afghanistan sanctions regime on February 12th. The resolution extended the mandate of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team to support the 1988 Afghanistan Sanctions Committee for 12 months. Yet to date, these sanctions have not brought about the change hoped for. It is time for the Security Council to review its sanctions against the Taliban and align them more clearly with political objectives in support of peace and security for the people of Afghanistan. The 90-day assessment window provides an opportunity to begin this process. Evolution of the 1988 Sanctions The sanctions regime under Resolution 1988 originated when these sanctions were separated from the 1267 ISIL/al-Qaida sanctions regime in 2011. Although counterterrorism remained the overall goal of both regimes, the purpose of this separation was to distinguish the Taliban from global terrorist organizations and treat them as a distinct Afghan political entity. The logic of this action was to signal political support for an Afghan-led peace process. Resolution 1988 provided the then Afghan government with important leverage: it could initiate requests to list and delist individuals and request travel ban waivers, usually when these individuals supported peace efforts. However, the role and leverage of the then Afghan government was neutralized when it was bypassed by the US, which entered direct high-level negotiations with the Taliban, concluding in a 2020 deal . The biggest change to the sanctions regime came with the 2021 collapse of the Afghan government. With the Taliban now taking over government institutions, concerns grew about the humanitarian impact of the sanctions regime. This led the Security Council to adopt Resolution 2615 , inserting a humanitarian carveout in the sanctions regime to ensure aid could reach ordinary people across Afghanistan. Yet apart from the carveout, the Security Council has defaulted to simply maintaining the status quo of the 1988 sanctions regime. The regime still includes an arms embargo, asset freeze, and a travel ban on 135 Taliban members and 5 entities, with the same criteria in place for listing and delisting. Most critically, while the regime remains a tool for the Security Council to pressure the Taliban, this tool is decoupled from a cohesive political strategy. Stakeholders ranging from Afghan opposition groups to international observers have debated whether to increase sanctions on the Taliban or provide relief. Some groups advocate for increased use of targeted sanctions as the key tool for holding the Taliban accountable for human rights abuses and inadequate action to counter terrorism. Many, especially in the United States, argue that sanctions relief would equate to legitimizing the Taliban. On the other hand, Russia and China have argued for increased cooperation with the regime in Kabul. Why Have the 1988 Sanctions Objectives and Conditions Not Been Updated Given the shifts on the ground since 2021, the current sanctions objectives are not sufficiently clear, and several conditions for delisting are outdated. For example, a now defunct condition left in place since 2015 is to evaluate if a sanctioned individual completed reconciliation programs with the former Afghan government. More broadly, the listing criteria are left at any association “with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan. They do not reflect the council’s expectations for how the Taliban should behave with the Afghan people, particularly women, and the international community. Reaching consensus on both adding benchmarks and updating listing and delisting criteria will require hard work to bridge the views of states like the US with those of states like Russia and China. Nonetheless, there has been a shortage of debate and deliberation, either publicly or in the council, on options for an update. It is time for the council to roll up its sleeves, given that simply maintaining the status quo of the 1988 sanctions is not delivering the desired policy objectives for Afghanistan. Moving forward, the five permanent council members agree on maintaining the 1988 sanctions regime as a baseline. However, they differ over the conditions for adjusting the regime or adding specific objectives. The recent resolution, with the United States as penholder, incorporated topics beyond counterterrorism or reconciliation, such as condemnation of kidnapping and hostage taking and regressive decrees targeting women’s rights. This has been criticized by Russia as “oversaturated” with topics unrelated to the original purpose of the 1988 regime. China argued that reviewing and adjusting the 1988 sanctions should be specifically tied to supporting peace and stability in Afghanistan. To address these differences on the topic and show support for the people of Afghanistan, it is only reasonable to begin a formal process of deliberation on updating the objectives of the sanctions. Such an update could reflect both the current realities of the country and the interests of Security Council members. Linking sanctions to benchmarks and updating listing criteria to respond to political conditions are not uncommon. The council has made such adjustments in other recent sanctions regimes. It added benchmarks for the Somalia/al-Shabaab sanctions regime in 2022, including the adoption of action plans to combat sexual violence in conflict and road maps on children and armed conflict. In the sanctions regime for South Sudan, listing criteria have been updated in response to political developments, such as specifying that impeding free and fair elections are grounds for designation. At least seven sanctions regimes refer to sexual and gender-based violence in the listing criteria. The council’s resolution delisting Ahmed al-Sharaa is its most high-profile case of delisting from the 1267 ISIL/al-Qaida sanctions regime. Here, without referencing a criterion, the council delisted al-Sharaa while recalling the expectations that Syria will “protect human rights and safety and security of all Syrians regardless of ethnicity or religion” and advance an inclusive political process. With the Assad government being replaced by al-Sharaa as the new leader, the council assessed that these were the conditions applicable to Syria’s current moment. While this is not a case of delisting according to new criteria, it provides a broader example of the council finding political will and bridging differences to adapt sanctions. These examples demonstrate the council updating its sanctions measures and their objectives in dynamic situations. They further indicate that the council has been able to tie sanctions measures to human rights, political, and governance indicators or expectations. They were not easily adopted and resulted in abstentions from some members, but they provide models that can inform updates to the 1988 sanctions. Why Updating the 1988 Sanctions Criteria Matters The extension of the 1988 regime’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team in February reflects many states’ profound mistrust of the Taliban and concern that terrorism is being fostered within Afghanistan’s territory. Updating sanctions criteria can appear risky because the Taliban may interpret any shift as a softening of the Security Council’s resolve. To mitigate this, the update process should be anchored in safety mechanisms that protect the interests of both the Afghan people and member states. Robust deliberations, both publicly and in the council, should kick off an incremental process where the UN holds consultations with Afghan civil society on potential updated sanctions conditions for the council to consider. Council members could then communicate to the Taliban that they must reverse some of their most restrictive decrees against women before council members would consider adopting new benchmarks. This increases the likelihood that the council does not expend diplomatic capital without something to show in return. Additionally, the strategic utility of sanctions, whether through relief or restrictions, is predicated on clearly defined political objectives. Considering that the sanctions have not coerced the Taliban to change policies, discussing conditions for relief could incentivize action. Both imposing and lifting sanctions depend on clearly stated behavioral objectives. In this context, it is incoherent, and even counterproductive, to argue for or against further restrictions or waivers to the 1988 regime. As a more impactful alternative, adding benchmarks and reviewing the listing and delisting criteria would establish an initial frame of reference for UN member states. This approach would also provide the council with indicators for collective monitoring that reflect the current moment. At the same time, it would fully preserve the council’s ability to grant exemptions or impose further measures as the situation evolves. But such an update is not just about the Taliban. It is an important opportunity to recenter marginalized voices. Resolution 2255 (2015) encourages the Monitoring Team and Sanctions Committee to consult with relevant stakeholders. Since the original consultative bodies like the High Peace Council no longer exist, the update process provides a specific UN platform for civil society, women, youth and other voices who are currently excluded from the Kabul-Kandahar power structures. The potential update process should be informed by those most affected by the Taliban’s policies. An update will also counteract the Taliban’s accusations there is no discussion or way to move forward on sanctions. The Security Council can communicate to the Taliban which actions can result in specific sanctions relief and which could trigger further restrictions. Even if the Taliban refuse to change their behavior, which is likely, the Security Council would win the narrative battle by providing a clear and a reasonable path forward. The burden of impasse and isolation would fall squarely on the Taliban’s shoulders. From a Static Legacy to a Tool for Diplomacy Difficulty in reaching consensus on updating the 1988 regime is not an excuse for passivity. If it is linked to clear objectives, the sanctions regime could be an active tool for diplomacy rather than a static legacy of the past. The Security Council should move beyond passive engagement and grapple with what it intends to achieve for Afghanistan. Yet this is a heavy lift that would require political will on the part of council members—especially the US, Russia, and China—to find common ground, drawing on the vital first-hand perspectives of Afghans themselves. To begin this process, the Security Council should take three actions: Leverage the 90-day review of UNAMA’s mandate. Following UNAMA’s three-month mandate renewal, the UN Security Council should utilize the review window to spark a debate on possible next steps in the evolution of the sanctions regime. After all, both UNAMA and the sanctions regime are part of the UN Security Council’s policy toolbox. It only makes sense that they reinforce one another, collectively contributing to a broader political vision for the UN in Afghanistan. Initiate a process to develop specific benchmarks for the sanctions regime: This would clarify the behavior changes the council expects from the Taliban, which would also inform updated listing and delisting criteria. It would draw on the work of both UNAMA and the 1988 Monitoring Team, combining the former’s on-the-ground insights with the latter’s technical expertise to devise options. Incorporate local voices and expertise: Building on Resolutions 2255 (2015) and other relevant resolutions, it is crucial that both UNAMA and the 1988 Monitoring Team consult with relevant Afghan stakeholders regarding updated criteria and work closely with Afghan subject-matter experts inside Afghanistan and in the diaspora to reflect their voices. The time for updating the objectives and conditions of the 1988 sanctions regime has come—all the more so in light of the unfolding war between Pakistan’s army and the Taliban, which is subjecting the people of Afghanistan to even harsher conditions. It is imperative for the council to seize this opportunity to move past the status quo. Originally Published in the Global Observatory
2026-03-26 04:02:20

Sudan: Analysis of humanitarian access in the Darfur and Kordofan regions (Briefing note 22 March 2026)
Country: Sudan Source: ACAPS Please refer to the attached file. Humanitarian access constraints have been a pervasive and persistent structural occurrence in Sudan’s continuing crisis, even as the conflict enters its fourth year (UNHCR 17/02/2026; OCHA 09/09/2025). A combination of shifting conflict lines, a deeply fragmented political landscape, physical and environmental challenges, and institutional barriers have resulted in constrained humanitarian access, with humanitarian organisations in the Darfur and Kordofan regions reporting significant bureaucratic and administrative impediments (BAIs) and insecurity constricting their operations (OCHA 16/03/2026; UNHCR 16/02/2026). Escalating conflict and the intensive use of aerial drone warfare have created significant security challenges for humanitarian personnel and assets, as the indiscriminate drone targeting of civilians is increasing insecurity for humanitarian convoys, damaging infrastructure, and creating unpredictable front lines (Sudan INGO 17/02/2026; MSF 19/02/2026). While humanitarian needs in frontline areas of the Darfur and Kordofan regions remain persistently elevated, continued attacks on humanitarian operations have slowed efforts to scale up aid interventions in these areas, as operations are suspended and movements reduced. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and allied armed groups also continue to impose parallel directives, such as registration requirements and coordination restrictions, that complicate aid coordination policies through BAIs, constraining humanitarian assistance. This is alongside neighbouring countries’ shifting policies around the cross-border delivery of aid into Sudan. Chad, for example, has ordered the closure of its shared border with Sudan, including the Adré and Tine crossing points, creating an additional layer of bureaucracy, coordination, and logistical constraint on humanitarian and commercial supply chains at the border (Sudan Tribune 22/02/2026; AJ 23/02/2026). Political instability in South Sudan and Ethiopia has also perpetuated growing insecurity and tensions, threatening humanitarian operations, especially the use of border routes and logistical corridors in Sudan.
2026-03-23 08:03:07

Afghanistan Earthquake: Five Months On, Recovery Continues
Country: Afghanistan Source: War Child UK In the aftermath of the Afghan earthquake, the shock was immediate, 500,000 people were impacted . But five months later, people across Kunar, Laghman and Nangarhar provinces are still living with loss of shelter, of income and of a sense of safety. War Child and its local partner Organisation for Human Welfare (OHW) were already on the ground which meant we were able to step up to help children and families affected, thanks to the support from the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO). A crucial first step in our work was establishing Community-Based Child Protection Committees. Community relationships post crisis are vital, so we can hear directly from people about their needs and involve them in decision-making and the roll out of our work. In Kunar, six committees have been established with 90 members in total, including 42 women and girls. We are providing cash for protection to help families cover urgent expenses for children who have been identified as vulnerable. This means the money supports each child’s individual needs, for example medical treatment for health complications or providing a wheelchair to a child who has faced injuries in the earthquake. For many caregivers, it's been difficult to find a steady income post-earthquake, and daily survival needs means facing impossible choices. Easing the financial pressure on families helps children recover from trauma and ensures their support is prioritised. In December alone, 24 families received cash and 300 children were identified and supported. For children, the emotional impact of the earthquake remains deep. In Kunar, we were able to provide specialist mental health and social support to 360 children who accessed our child friendly spaces in the months following the earthquake, up to November. These are spaces where fear can be spoken aloud and where a sense of safety can begin to return. Local communities have now taken over the work at these spaces, with check ins and support from the War Child team. Child-friendly spaces continue to play a vital role in this recovery. These safe, welcoming places allow children whose homes have been destroyed and who are dealing with trauma to play, learn, and simply be children again. In Kunar, six additional child-friendly spaces have been established as part of the earthquake response and will support around 1080 children. Heating, stationary, toys and food and drink are being provided through our partner OHW. Recovery takes time. But with sustained support, children and families are not facing it alone.
2026-03-23 08:01:28

oPt: Humanitarian Situation Report | 19 March 2026
Country: occupied Palestinian territory Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Please refer to the attached file. Highlights Families across the Occupied Palestinian Territory are concluding the month of Ramadan amid deepening humanitarian needs and heightened exposure to violence, displacement and destruction of property; UN human rights officials warn of a pattern of unlawful killings. In the Gaza Strip , reports of airstrikes and other attacks hitting civilian areas continue, while over the weekend, a strong dust storm damaged the shelters and belongings of hundreds of families in displacement sites. In the West Bank , settler attacks have become more severe, with a 54 per cent increase in injuries and a more than fourfold increase in related displacement this year compared with 2025 averages. Access to Gaza remains restricted, with Kerem Shalom being the only operational crossing point for humanitarian and commercial supplies, resulting in a major bottleneck; meanwhile, the Israeli authorities have announced the resumption of limited medical evacuations and returns through Rafah crossing. Overview Families across the Occupied Palestinian Territory have observed the month of Ramadan amid tightened restrictions and heightened risks to their safety. The UN Human Rights Office ( OHCHR ) has raised alarm over a pattern of unlawful killings following incidents on 15 March in which two Palestinian families were reportedly killed by Israeli fire in Gaza and the West Bank. The office warned that these incidents, alongside escalating settler attacks and intimidation against Palestinian communities, raise serious concerns about impunity and protection risks for civilians. In the Gaza Strip , most people remain displaced, often living in dire conditions with limited protection and inadequate access to diverse and sufficient supplies, while continuing to face daily shooting and strikes hitting residential areas. Casualties continue to be reported including among children and women. The Israeli authorities have announced that the Rafah Crossing will reopen for the resumption of limited movement of people, namely medical evacuation and returns. Kerem Shalom remains the only operational crossing for cargo, creating a major bottleneck for incoming supplies. In the West Bank , including East Jerusalem, the humanitarian situation has further deteriorated. This is marked by rising casualties, intensified violence by Israeli settlers, and increased risk of eviction. Displacement linked to settler attacks and access restrictions so far in 2026 has already reached about 95 per cent of the total numbers recorded in the whole of 2025. Since the beginning of March, intensified movement restrictions have limited people’s access to land, livelihoods and essential services, and further exacerbated a pre-existing coercive environment that pushes people out of their homes and communities. These risks have intensified in the context of regional escalation, which has led to fatalities and injuries as well as property damage. Gaza Strip Airstrikes, shelling, and gunfire continued across the Gaza Strip, reportedly resulting in civilian casualties. On 15 March, an airstrike in the Az Zawayda area of Deir al Balah reportedly killed a man, his pregnant wife, their son, and another boy. Later in the day, an unmanned aerial vehicle reportedly struck a car, also in Az Zawayda, killing eight Palestinian police personnel, according to the UN Human Rights Office ( OHCHR ). Overall, according to the Ministry of Health (MoH) in Gaza, between 6 and 17 March, 35 Palestinians were killed, one succumbed to wounds, three bodies were retrieved and 95 people were injured. Since the announcement of the ceasefire in October 2025, 673 Palestinians have reportedly been killed, according to MoH. On 14 March, a severe sandstorm accompanied by strong winds affected multiple areas across the Gaza Strip, followed by rainfall that further worsened already fragile living conditions in displacement sites. The high winds caused extensive damage to temporary shelters and site infrastructure, particularly those built from lightweight materials with limited reinforcement. According to the Site Management Cluster, 894 households were affected in displacement sites, with 29 family shelters destroyed and 32 damaged, along with several education, nutrition and child protection facilities. Humanitarian partners have been responding to alerts from affected families, with 76 households having already received multisectoral assistance packages, 689 households having received tarpaulins and seven having received a 50-square-metre plastic-film roll as of 17 March. Efforts continue to assess and attend to the remaining alerts. In addition, 80 households affected by airstrikes received multisectoral assistance packages, including tarpaulins, clothing kits, blankets, and cereals between 8 and 14 March. Market conditions remain volatile. Between 9 and 15 March, food prices continued fluctuating sharply, with the prices of some items, such as oranges, rising by 84 per cent compared with the previous week and the prices of other items increasing by 5 to 30 per cent. The prices of staples like chicken, rice, sugar and flour have dropped back to levels recorded before the regional escalation. Prices of non‐food items remained stable. Compared with pre‐October 2023 levels, inflation has reached 305 per cent so far in March, up from 153 per cent in February. Cash‐out commissions remained stable. Shortages and high price of cooking gas will affect families’ observation of Eid al Fitr. Humanitarian operations in Gaza continue despite ongoing constraints. As of 19 March, the Kerem Shalom Crossing remained the only operational entry point to Gaza. The Zikim Crossing in the north is closed until further notice. Rafah Crossing reopened on 19 March for limited movement of people in both directions, allowing the resumption of medical evacuations and returnee movements that have been paused since the regional escalation on 28 February.
2026-03-23 07:53:09

Tchad : quand l’eau devient une quête quotidienne
Country: Chad Source: International Committee of the Red Cross Depuis près de trois ans, le conflit au Soudan pousse des milliers de familles à fuir vers le Tchad, abandonnant leurs maisons et parfois leurs proches. Dans l’est aride du pays, près d’un million et demi de réfugiés Soudanais ou de Tchadiens autrefois installés au Darfour tentent de survivre. Parmi eux, des femmes et des enfants qui, chaque jour, affrontent un défi vital : trouver de l’eau. Cette quête quotidienne devient aussi un parcours semé de dangers. Dans les camps accueillant des dizaines de milliers de personnes, sous une chaleur écrasante, l’accès à l’eau potable est devenu une urgence. Ici, l’eau n’est pas un luxe, mais une condition de survie : boire, cuisiner, laver les enfants, et préserver un minimum de dignité. À Adré, ville frontalière avec le Soudan, l’arrivée massive de réfugiés a mis la ville sous une pression extrême. Avant la guerre, elle comptait environ 25 000 habitants. En quelques mois, plus de 150 000 réfugiés soudanais s’y sont installés. Les mêmes puits et les mêmes tuyaux, pour six fois plus de personnes, transforment chaque geste du quotidien en un défi. Chaque pas vers l’eau était un danger Aziza Abdulgadir a fui El Geneina, au Soudan, avec dix membres de sa famille, emportant avec elle la peur et l’incertitude. Un matin, son mari est parti régler des affaires et n’est jamais revenu. Elle découvrira plus tard qu’il se trouvait dans un camp de personnes déplacées au Soudan. Depuis trois ans, Aziza survit seule avec ses six enfants, ses sœurs et leur mère dans un camp de transit à Adré. À leur arrivée, l’eau était rare et difficile à atteindre. Sous un soleil implacable, il fallait marcher pendant des heures pour en obtenir. Malade, Aziza ne pouvait pas se rendre au point d’eau. Ce sont donc les enfants qui faisaient ce trajet quotidien. « Je ne me sens pas bien. Je ne peux pas porter un bidon d’eau sur ma tête. Ce sont donc les enfants qui marchaient longtemps pour aller chercher de l’eau. Une heure pour l’aller, une heure pour le retour, deux fois par jour. Quatre heures de marche chaque jour, sans compter le temps d’attente » , raconte-t-elle. Dans ces camps, il n’est pas rare que les enfants prennent le relais lorsque les adultes ne peuvent pas se déplacer. Mais chaque sortie reste une épreuve : les chemins sont isolés, loin des regards et des abris, exposant les plus jeunes aux agressions, au harcèlement et à la violence. Un enfant seul, bidon vide à la main, à l’aube ou au crépuscule, devient une cible. En 2024, un nouveau point d’eau a été établi par le CICR; il est situé à moins de deux minutes de chez Aziza. Deux minutes seulement, contre deux heures auparavant. Pour beaucoup, ce changement peut sembler anodin. Pour elle et ses enfants, c’est une véritable libération. La longue marche sous le soleil et la peur constante sur la route appartiennent désormais au passé. En regardant ses enfants remplir leurs bidons près de la maison, elle ne peut s’empêcher de sourire. « Maintenant, l’eau est à proximité. À n’importe quelle heure, les enfants peuvent aller la chercher sans risque. Nous prenons notre douche avec, nous préparons à manger, nous buvons... L’eau est la source de la vie. » L’eau au prix du courage Darassalam Abdallah, elle, a quitté El Geneina à pied. Le souvenir du voyage vers le Tchad est encore gravé dans sa mémoire et sur son corps. Pour elle, l’exil a le goût de la poussière et de l’effort physique. « Quand nous avons quitté le Soudan, nous avons marché jusqu’au Tchad. Je suis arrivée avec mes cinq enfants. J’ai des jumeaux, j’en portais un sur le dos et l’autre dans mes bras » , raconte-t-elle. Pendant toute une journée, elle a marché sous le poids de ses enfants et de l’incertitude. Arrivée à Adré dans l’est du Tchad, elle a dû apprendre à survivre avec presque rien. Son quotidien était rythmé par une quête d’eau quotidienne qui mettait son corps et ses maigres ressources à l’épreuve. Avant de préparer le moindre repas, avant de donner à manger à ses enfants, il fallait d'abord aller chercher l'eau. « Je prenais mes jumeaux, un sur le dos, un dans les bras, et mon bidon sur la tête. Je marchais des kilomètres pour aller chercher de l'eau. Avec les enfants, je ne peux pas marcher rapidement, alors je m'arrêtais, je faisais des pauses. C'était très compliqué. » Au point d’eau, l’attente peut durer encore une heure, parfois plus, sous un soleil écrasant. Et l’eau n’est pas gratuite. « J’achetais l’eau à 250 livres soudanaises le bidon, deux fois par jour, cela faisait 500 livres, et je n’étais même pas sûr que l’eau était propre », raconte-t-elle. Aujourd'hui, le point d'eau du CICR est juste en face de sa maison. « Depuis que le CICR a installé l'eau à côté de chez moi, le matin je peux un peu me reposer. » Une phrase qui dit tout sur ce que signifie l'accès à l'eau pour une mère seule, avec des enfants en bas âge, dans un camp de réfugiés. L’intervention humanitaire face à l’urgence Face à cette urgence vitale, le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR), avec son partenaire, la Croix-Rouge du Tchad, a déployé d’importants moyens pour relever le défi de l’approvisionnement en eau dans les sites de transit d’Adré. L’objectif était clair : rapprocher l’eau des populations afin d’alléger leur fardeau et de garantir leur santé et leur sécurité. Mamadou Aliou Sow, délégué en charge des programmes « eau et habitat » du CICR pour l’est du Tchad, explique la réponse stratégique mise en place : « La première phase dans l’urgence a consisté à acheminer et distribuer de l’eau potable à l’aide de camions-citernes. C’était une solution temporaire mais indispensable pour répondre aux besoins les plus urgents. » Dès le premier trimestre 2024, le CICR a réalisé quatre forages qui fonctionnent aujourd’hui avec l’énergie solaire. Aujourd’hui, ces points de distribution d’eau sont opérationnels dans le site de transit, produisant jusqu’à 140 000 litres d’eau potable par jour. « Cela permet de couvrir les besoins en eau potable d’environ 10 000 personnes, avec presque 15 litres par personne et par jour », précise Mamadou Aliou Sow. Un cinquième point d’eau est en cours de construction et bénéficiera à 2 000 personnes supplémentaires. Ces chiffres, bien qu’impressionnants, ne concernent encore que 10 % de la population du camp, ce qui souligne l’ampleur des besoins restants. De plus, ces points d’eau sont également utilisés par les habitants de la ville, preuve que la crise touche l’ensemble de la communauté et que l’action du CICR profite à tous. Mais la réponse ne se limite pas à l’urgence. Mamadou Aliou Sow souligne : « La réhabilitation du réseau d’eau et du château d’eau de la ville d’Adré, d’une capacité de 240 m3, permettra aux réfugiés et aux populations locales de partager cette ressource, contribuant ainsi à atténuer les tensions entre les communautés. » Parallèlement, plus d’une centaine de latrines ont été construites pour répondre aux besoins d’hygiène et prévenir la propagation de maladies. Les histoires d'Aziza et de Darassalam à Adré illustrent la crise humanitaire qui secoue l'est du Tchad. Derrière les chiffres, il y a des visages, des mères qui se battent pour leurs enfants, des familles qui tentent de survivre dans la dignité. L'eau n'est pas seulement un liquide dans un bidon. C’est la santé d’un enfant, la sécurité qui apaise une femme, le repos qui permet à une mère de tenir encore un jour de plus. C’est, tout simplement, le droit – fondamental - de vivre avec dignité.
2026-03-23 07:45:38

Health and climate change country profile 2025 - Haiti
Country: Haiti Sources: Pan American Health Organization, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, World Health Organization Please refer to the attached file. Description Haiti’s Health and Climate Change Country Profile 2025 is a newly developed resource that brings together, for the first time, a clear, accessible picture of how climate trends intersect with public health in the country. It synthesizes the best available data and on-the-ground insights to show where climate hazards affect health, who is most at risk, and which actions can most effectively strengthen services and save lives. The profile highlights Haiti’s emerging efforts to assess climate risks, monitor health vulnerabilities, and lay the foundations of a climate-resilient health system. It points to practical entry points—stronger surveillance and risk communication, heat-health and vector-borne disease preparedness, climate-smart health facilities, and better coordination with water, disaster management, and urban planning—to protect people and communities in a situation of vulnerability, including older people and those living with chronic conditions. Developed in alignment with PAHO/WHO guidance and the Caribbean Action Plan on Health and Climate Change, the profile is designed as a working tool for decision-makers. It supports planning, financing, and implementation by outlining priority actions, capacity needs, and opportunities for co-benefits that improve health while advancing low-carbon, resilient development. As part of PAHO’s regional initiative, this country profile aims to enable policymakers, health professionals, and development partners to focus investments where they matter most, strengthen preparedness across the health system, and foster collaboration within and beyond the health sector. Above all, it provides a practical roadmap to reduce climate-related health risks and promote a healthier, more resilient future for everyone in Haiti.
2026-03-19 02:01:07

Health and climate change country profile 2025 - Saint Kitts and Nevis
Country: Saint Kitts and Nevis Sources: Pan American Health Organization, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, World Health Organization Please refer to the attached file. Saint Kitts and Nevis’s Health and Climate Change Country Profile 2025 provides a comprehensive overview of how climate change is affecting public health in this twin-island nation – and the steps being taken to build resilience. As a small island developing state, Saint Kitts and Nevis faces heightened exposure to sea level rise, extreme heat, hurricanes, and water scarcity, with significant implications for health systems, food and water security, and vulnerable populations. The profile highlights the country’s key health risks linked to climate change, including heat-related illnesses, vector-borne and waterborne diseases, food insecurity, and mental health challenges. With rising temperatures and more frequent disasters, health facilities, especially those along the coast, face increasing strain. A growing burden of noncommunicable diseases further compounds the nation’s climate vulnerability. Despite these challenges, Saint Kitts and Nevis is advancing efforts to strengthen its health system’s adaptive capacity. The country has conducted a national vulnerability and adaptation assessment, established a Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Committee, and participated in the Green Climate Fund Caribbean Readiness Project led by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) to lay the foundation for the development of a health national adaptation plan by 2026. Investments in early warning systems, workforce training, and infrastructure retrofitting are under way. However, gaps remain in intersectoral coordination, climate-informed surveillance, and access to sustainable financing. This profile identifies priority areas for future action, including expanding SMART health facility initiatives, developing a climate-smart health workforce, and improving safe water and sanitation systems. As part of PAHO’s regional initiative, this profile serves as a strategic tool to support policy coherence, build institutional capacity, and guide evidence-based decision-making for protecting health in the face of climate change in Saint Kitts and Nevis.
2026-03-19 01:57:37

L'IFRC consternée par la mort d’un collègue du Croissant-Rouge iranien
Country: Iran (Islamic Republic of) Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Téhéran/Beyrouth/Genève, 15 mars 2026 : La Fédération internationale des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge (IFRC) est consternée par la mort de Hamidreza Jahanbakhsh, membre du personnel de la Société du Croissant-Rouge iranien originaire de la province d’Ispahan, tué lors d’une opération de recherche et de sauvetage à Tiran-o-Korun, dans la province d’Ispahan, le 8 mars. Hamidreza Jahanbakhsh a perdu la vie en accomplissant son devoir humanitaire en venant en aide aux personnes affectées par les hostilités en cours. L'IFRC présente ses sincères condoléances à sa famille, à ses proches et à l’ensemble de ses collègues du Croissant-Rouge iranien. Depuis le début du conflit, plusieurs autres membres du personnel et volontaires du Croissant-Rouge iranien ont également été blessés dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions. L’emblème du Croissant-Rouge est un symbole de protection, d’humanité, de neutralité et d’espoir. Pourtant, trop souvent, nos volontaires et notre personnel sont tués alors qu’ils accomplissent un travail vital. Cela est inacceptable. Nous exprimons notre solidarité avec la Société du Croissant-Rouge iranien et avec tous les travailleurs humanitaires qui apportent une aide vitale dans des conditions difficiles et souvent dangereuses. La sécurité et la protection du personnel humanitaire, ainsi que le respect de l’emblème du Croissant-Rouge, sont essentielles pour garantir la continuité d’une assistance impartiale et vitale aux personnes dans le besoin. Une fois de plus, notre réseau pleure la perte d’un collègue. Toute attaque contre les humanitaires est inacceptable et doit être condamnée. Nous ne cesserons jamais d’appeler à la protection des équipes humanitaires : il s’agit d’une obligation morale et juridique. Depuis le début de l’année, sept membres du réseau de l'IFRC ont perdu la vie dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions. Pour plus d'informations: media@ifrc.org A Beyrouth: Mey Al Sayegh, +961 761 744 68 A Genève Tommaso Della Longa, +41 79 708 4367
2026-03-19 01:53:55

Lebanon: Déclaration : « Nous sommes indignés que des travailleurs humanitaires continuent d’être tués dans les conflits. »
Countries: Lebanon, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Cette déclaration est attribuée à Kate Forbes, présidente de la Fédération internationale des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge, et à Mirjana Spoljaric, présidente du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge. Genève, 13 mars 2026 — Depuis l’escalade des hostilités au Moyen-Orient, le personnel humanitaire et médical est pris pour cible, mettant en péril les services essentiels dont dépendent les civils pour survivre. Si cette situation persiste, nous craignons de devoir bientôt pleurer davantage de collègues tués alors qu’ils tentaient de sauver des vies. En moins de deux semaines, ces craintes deviennent déjà réalité. Un ambulancier de la Croix-Rouge libanaise est décédé des suites de blessures critiques subies alors qu’il tentait de porter secours à des civils blessés, et d’autres ont été blessés. En Iran, des membres du personnel et des volontaires de la Société du Croissant-Rouge iranien ont également été touchés alors qu’ils venaient en aide aux civils dans le contexte des hostilités. Malgré les dangers, le personnel et les volontaires de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge, ainsi que ceux du Magen David Adom en Israël, continuent d’intervenir dans toute la région, au péril de leur vie, pour soutenir les personnes dans le besoin. Le personnel humanitaire est protégé par le droit international humanitaire. Il y a un an ce mois-ci, huit ambulanciers du Croissant-Rouge palestinien ont été brutalement tués alors qu’ils portaient secours à des blessés à Gaza, suscitant une indignation mondiale. Pourtant, dans les conflits à travers le monde, les travailleurs humanitaires et médicaux continuent d’être tués, blessés, enlevés ou détenus alors qu’ils tentent d’atteindre les populations dans le besoin. Mercredi encore, un collègue de l’UNICEF a été tué lors d’une frappe de drone signalée en République démocratique du Congo. Depuis le début de l’année, des membres du personnel et des volontaires de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge ont été tués dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions non seulement au Liban, mais aussi au Soudan, à Gaza et en Iran. Nous l’avons déjà demandé, et nous le répétons : les États et les parties aux conflits doivent prendre des mesures concrètes et immédiates pour protéger celles et ceux qui risquent tout pour sauver des vies. Lorsque les travailleurs humanitaires sont protégés, c’est notre humanité commune qui l’est aussi. La vie de nos équipes, et de celles et ceux qu’elles servent, en dépend. Pour plus d'informations, merci de nous écrire à l'adresse: IFRC: media@ifrc.org ICRC: press@icrc.org
2026-03-19 01:50:56

Eight Arab, Islamic countries condemn the continued closure by the Israeli occupation authorities of the gates of Al-Aqsa Mosque / Al-Haram Al-Sharif to Muslim worshippers
Doha, Qatar: The Foreign Ministers of the State of Qatar, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, the Republic of Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Republic of Türkiye, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Republic of Egypt condemn Israeli occupation authorities' continued closure of the gates of Al-Aqsa Mosque / Al-Haram Al-Sharif to Muslim worshippers particularly during the holy month of Ramadan. Security restrictions on access to the Old City of Jerusalem and its places of worship coupled with discriminatory and arbitrary access restrictions to the other places of worship in the old city constitute a flagrant violation to international law, including international humanitarian law, the historical and legal status quo, and the principle of unrestricted access to places of worship. The Ministers affirmed their absolute rejection and condemnation of this illegal and unjustified measure, as well as Israel's continued provocative actions at Al-Aqsa Mosque / Al-Haram Al-Sharif and against worshippers. They stressed that Israel has no sovereignty over occupied Jerusalem or its Islamic and Christian holy sites. The Ministers reiterated that the entire area of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, which amounts to 144 dunams, is a place of worship exclusively for Muslims, and that the Jerusalem Endowments and Al-Aqsa Mosque Affairs Department, affiliated with the Jordanian Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, is the legal entity with exclusive jurisdiction to administer the affairs of the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque/Haram Al-Sharif and regulate entry to it. The Ministers called on Israel, as the occupying Power, to immediately cease the closure of the gates of Al-Aqsa Mosque, remove access restrictions to the Old City of Jerusalem, and refrain from obstructing Muslim worshippers' access to the mosque. They also called on the international community to adopt a firm position that compels Israel to halt its ongoing violations and illegal practices against Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, as well as its violations of the sanctity of these holy places.
2026-03-11 19:54:16

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