Trump’s narratives are not gaining traction

Trump’s narratives are not gaining traction The narratives have been short on answers to the lingering questions on the minds of reporters and the public at large. Saturday 04/04/2026 A restaurant customer watches US President Donald Trump address the nation on the Iran crisis from the White House on a TV screen in New York, April 1, 2026. US President Donald Trump’s approval ratings have hit a record low. According to a CNN aggregate of various US ratings, his overall disapproval level now stands at 61 percent while his approval hovers around a mere 37 percent. The drop in the US president’s popularity cannot be dissociated from American views regarding the war in Iran; which seem to follow a similarly unfavourable trend. A CNN poll published this week showed the US public’s disapproval of the war on Iran rising to 66 percent, a seven percent increase compared to where it was at the beginning of the conflict in February 28. Attitudes towards the war have proven to be a hugely polarising issue based on party affiliation. According to a Pew poll, 90 percent of Democrats and Democratic-leaning voters said they disapproved of Trump’s handling of the conflict. On the other side of the political spectrum, about seven-in-ten Republicans and Republican-leaning voters expressed approval of how Trump is handling the war and believe the US made the right decision by launching strikes on Iran. Partisan loyalty does not however reflect the emerging fissures within Trump’s MAGA movement nor the impact the war is bound to have on Republicans as the race intensifies between JD Vance and Marco Rubio to win party endorsement for the 2028 presidential nomination. Trump’s public opinion problem extends beyond US borders as America’s global reputation is clearly at stake in the war. In Europe, which has stayed away from the conflict, the level of support has remained low. In Germany, for instance, an ARD poll showed that only 58 percent felt the war was “justified” and 15 percent only said they trusted the United States. In the Global South, the picture has not been very different. A GeoPoll survey conducted in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa this month, showed that 69 percent were “very concerned” about the economic repercussions from the war. Among respondents, 38 percent blamed Israel for the conflict, 29 percent the US and 18 percent Iran. Experts believe that a big part of the problem is that Trump’s narratives, which have not gained traction among majorities in the US and other parts of the world, even where there were negative perceptions of the Iranian regime. Prior to the war, while talks continued, the US administration never made a clear case for a compelling need to attack Iran. In fact, the negotiations in Muscat, Rome and Doha validated the notion that the diplomatic process was arduous but worth pursuing. In this war, Trump carries with him decades-old legacies of US wars and reactions to them in the US and the rest of the world. In these past conflicts, public attitudes often depended on how long the US involvement lasted and what kind of human and economic cost it inflicted on Americans. Such considerations are bound to gain even more prominence in an election year such as this, where Republicans risk losing their slim majority in both houses of the US Congress. Through the years and as technology has allowed it, US military strategists have sought to minimise casualties by conducting America’s wars from the air, even if that heightened risks on the receiving end of the bombs. So far, only 15 US soldiers have died in the current war, compared to hundreds in Iran and scores in neighbouring Arab countries. But looking ahead, the US military as well as the public at large fear heavier losses that might occur in any future ground campaign. Knowing the relevance of the conflict’s duration to public attitudes, Trump told Americans, in his April 1 televised speech, to “keep this conflict in perspective,” as he contrasted the current five-week involvement in Iran to preceding US entanglements in Iraq, Vietnam and Korea, which lasted much longer. Then, there is the economic bill which Americans will have to foot. When the price of petrol topped the $4 a gallon mark, for the first time in more than three years, the US average price was said to have crossed “a psychological threshold” among Americans. Adding to the concern of consumers is the uncertainty over how long the high fuel prices will last and to what further level they could shoot up. Trying to assuage American worries, the US president argued in his speech that prices will quickly come down by the end of the war and that the country, the world’s top oil producer, does not depend any more on Gulf supplies and hence will not be impacted by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Some experts are however sceptical, believing that it will in fact take weeks if not months for prices to settle at a normal level. Many in countries dependent on energy imports are even more worried than Americans about having to live with their own governments’ decisions to hike oil prices, which could in turn spark an inflationary spiral. Conflicting messages about the timeline and end game of the conflict have only helped fuel doubts about Trump’s conduct of the war and the credibility of his narratives. His proclaimed decimation of Iran’s firepower at a time contrasted sharply with Tehran’s continuing assaults on vital infrastructure in neighbouring Gulf countries. This explains why 67 percent of Americans believe Trump does not have “a clear plan for handling the situation in Iran”, according to the CNN poll. US narratives have also remained vague on many aspects of the war. Benchmarks seemed at odds with possible results on the ground. Ravi Agrawal, the chief editor of Foreign Policy, argued in a recent article that the US is perceived as losing in the showdown with Iran because it had set “maximalist aims at the start of the war”. Wavering made the perception worse. The narratives have also been short on answers to the lingering questions on the minds of reporters and the wider public. They did not for instance provide a valid explanation as to why Washington was “surprised” by Iran’s attacks on its Gulf states, despite indications they were a very likely scenario. Furthermore, at a time when Arab Gulf nations are concerned about the serious threat of Tehran’s continued obstruction of the Strait of Hormuz, Trump did not at times exclude the option of bailing out from the conflict, even if the waterway were to remain shut. Furthermore, the narratives did not convincingly address the persistent speculation that Washington was dragged into this war by its Israeli allies and not by its own considerations. As the war escalates and spills over into other countries of the region, US diplomacy has yet to show more than scant attention to the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Lebanon. The tragedy there has long evolved into something bigger than just collateral damage from main war. For many in the region, Washington’s credibility will be tested by its ability to say with confidence that Iran’s neighbours will be shielded from future threats from Tehran and that durable peace and stability will rule the day in the Middle East once the guns fall silent, if and when they finally do.
2026-04-04 08:45:33