Countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan Source: European Union Agency for Asylum Please refer to the attached file. Major legislative, security-related, and humanitarian developments 1. Legislative developments On 4 January 2026, the de facto government issued a ‘Criminal Procedure Code for Courts’. There was no public announcement of the new code. 1 The Afghan human rights organisation, Rawadari, was the first organisation to report on it, and by that made it public. 2 The new Code contains 119 articles, and some stand in contradiction with international human rights standards. 3 The Code makes reference to ‘slaves’ and ‘masters’ in several instances and some sources suggest it indirectly authorises slavery.4 For example, Article 15 outlines that the type of punishment (prescribed or discretionary) is to be ruled depending on ‘whether the criminal is free or a slave’, and Article 4(5) authorises a ‘master’ [badaar] to enforce discretionary punishment (tazir).5 Moreover, Article 9 divides society into four social categories: ‘scholars’, ‘the elite’, the ‘middle class’ and ‘the lower class’. It further states that legal consequences are to be determined by social status rather than the crime itself, with punishments worsening with the lower social standing of the convict. For example, while a religious scholar would be punished by being given ‘advice’, those from the lower class may be sentenced with corporal punishment and imprisonment for the same crime. 6 In an interview with BBC Afghan Service, as reported by the Afghanistan Analyst Network (AAN), a Taliban spokesperson ‘implicitly’ place de facto government officials in the ‘nobles category’ as he said that ‘this category was not limited to government officials, but could include sadat, (descendants of the Prophet), tribal elders and other influential figures.’ The AAN further noted that the references to slavery must be ‘particularly troubling’ for the Shia Hazara community who have a ‘more recent, family memories of enslavement’ under King Abdul Rahman Khan’s reign at the end of the nineteenth century. Rawadari noted that inter alia Article 18 prescribes flogging very extensively’ and ‘without clear limitations’, which constitutes an expansion of such punishment by law according to their analysis. 8 Rawadari further noted that the Code is incompatible with fair trail standards, and lacks references to the rights of accessing a defence lawyer, remaining silent, or receiving compensation. Moreover, ‘the Code has not specified minimum and maximum penalties, and by eliminating the process of independent investigation in proving criminal acts and instead has instituted “confession” and “testimony” as the primary means of proving guilt’. According to Rawadari’s analysis this ‘significantly heightens the risk of torture, serious abuse and widespread violations of the rights of the accused’.9 Some of the articles highlighted by Rawadari includes articles that ‘legalise[s] and formalise[s] discrimination against religious minorities’ and significantly narrow civic space, including: • Article 2 (8), only describes followers of the Hanafi school of thought as Muslims, while those following other Muslim branches or other religions are referred to as ‘heretics’. • Article 2 (11), a ‘rebel’, i.e. someone who ‘strives to spread corruption’, ‘cannot be reformed without being put to death’. According to Rawadari, this article grants the de facto judicial institutions and branches of the de facto state ‘broad and dangerous authority to kill opponents, critics, and human rights activists’ without a fair trial. • Article 2 (14), states that for hudud crimes and blood money crimes, only attention should be paid to ‘the crime itself’ and not to the ‘personality of the perpetrator’. According to Rawadari, this article indicates that the mental state, capacity and intent of the perpetrator is not to be taken into account, which violates fair trail principles. • Article 4 (6), states that all Muslims ‘whenever they witness sinners committing a sin, are permitted to proceed with their punishment’. According to Rawadari, this article grants ordinary citizens, the morality police and Taliban-aligned clerics to punish others. • Article 13, calls for the destruction of ‘places or [moral] corruption’, without defining the term. • Article 14, stipulates that it is permissible to kill those who ‘defend false beliefs contrary to Islam’ or ‘invite others to such beliefs’, with the permission of ‘the Imam’ [according to the AAN this is to be understood as the state in this context10]. • Article 17 (2), stipulates that mockery and ridicule of Islamic rulings is punishable with two years’ imprisonment, without defining the terms ‘mockery’ and ‘ridicule’. • Article 19, states that if a person commits an act that has been prohibited by the Supreme Leader, ‘they are deemed criminal and deserving of punishment’. Rawadari
2026-03-30 11:33:08